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2. Korea - North China - Japan

UN tactical surprise at Inchon, despite North Korean defense preparations, was achieved as a result of North Korean preoccupation with the possibility of landings farther south. Recent messages directed the reinforcement of North Korean east coast units, especially with artillery. Recent formation of a Chongjin infantry brigade, believed to be a coastal defense unit, indicates concern over the defense of an area remote from the combat zone. "Undersea mine laying troops" were to be dispatched to Mokpo on 12 September in an attempt to bolster defenses in that area.

There has been no indication of Soviet or Chinese Communist intention to intervene. There is no evidence that recent tank and vehicle columns reported moving south from the Manchurian border are composed of Chinese or Soviet forces.

Organized strength of the North Korean Army in the combat zones, as of the date of the Inchon landings, is now estimated to have been 125,000 (14 infantry divisions, one tank division, and supporting units), with an additional 15,000 in the defense or anti-landing force, and 8,000 internal security troops. 10,000 of these troops, including one previously unidentified division, are believed to have been deployed in the Seoul-Inchon area. There is no firm estimate of the strength of organized forces outside the combat zones north of the 38th parallel.

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
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The preparations for stepped-up air operations continue. Communications intelligence indicates the existence of a North Korean air division, which, if patterned on Soviet lines, could control 150 fighter or ground attack aircraft. No firm evidence is available on actual North Korean aircraft strength inside or outside Korea.

Communications intelligence shows that, at least up to 18 September, moderate quantities of material were being delivered to combat units.

A Soviet message of late August indicates that the UN naval blockade of Korea is at least partially responsible for congestion at Vladivostok, since commodities, including oil, previously sent by sea to Korea must now be reshipped from Vladivostok by rail. The expansion of facilities at Otpor and possibly at Pogranichnaya, rail transshipment points on the Soviet-Manchurian border, probably reflects the effects of the blockade.

A recent Chinese Communist complaint about the lack of Soviet oil at Shanghai is believed to be an indication that Soviet petroleum shipments into China are destined for use only in Manchuria.



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
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The possibility of increased North Korean air operations was reported last week. This possibility has been enhanced by recent North Korean directives for night flight training, construction of new airfields (probably below the 38th parallel), repair of damaged airfields, construction of concealed tunnels for aircraft, and the camouflage of air installations.

Concern over possible UN amphibious landings has caused North Korean leaders to divert front line strength to coastal defense.

North Korean units are now finding it more difficult to "live off the country" in recently occupied areas. On 14 August, a forward headquarters reported insufficient food in the Andong area (50 miles north of Taegu) and requested "two or three trainloads of food immediately" thereby adding further strain to an already difficult supply problem.



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